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Collective Amnesia and the 
Northern Ireland Model of 
Conflict Resolution
John Bew
Northern Ireland, as we all know, is often presented as a model for conflict resolution around the world. That it should be is a reflection of the success of the peace process 
there, the key moment of the success of the peace process which was the Belfast Agreement 
of 1998. There are numerous exciting stories about Northern Ireland’s transition from war to 
peace which translate well in other conflict zones and have a certain appeal to them and, 
in some instances, even an element of glamour. The job of the historian is to re-insert some 
complexity into these stories, and to balance contending narratives about ‘what brought 
peace’. Before we begin to discuss the ‘lessons’ of Northern Ireland for other trouble-spots 
around the world, it seems important that we get over that hurdle first. 
To say this much is to risk striking a discordant note from what might be called the ‘peace process 
industry’. It also carries with it the danger of going against prevailing political fashion and to be labelled 
as somehow anti-peace process. This is a symptom of the poor quality of the debate and the collective 
amnesia which underpins it. My view is that it is admirable that the ending of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland is examined and it is to be welcomed that thought is given to what lessons it might hold for 
Israel/Palestine, Iraq, East Timor, Sri Lanka, or other places. Yet for these efforts to be genuinely helpful 
and intellectually honest, it is important that we also consider the less ‘glamorous’ sides of the story. 
This paper makes the case that much of what has been said about Northern Ireland has been either over-
simplified, or, over-conceptualised in a way that fails to acknowledge the ragged edges of real historical 
experience. The over-simplification is partly the product of the enthusiasm of eager participants in the 
peace process who wish transfer their experience elsewhere; in some instances, though not all, their 
efforts are over-laden with preconceptions about other conflicts. The over-conceptualisation is perhaps 
more the responsibility of academics, who insert post-facto rationalisation and schema to interpret the 
peace process, in a way which is remote from the reality on the ground at the time. 
The Northern Ireland peace process cannot be separated from the conflict that preceded it and, indeed, 
overlapped with it. That conflict was often dirty, messy, morally dubious, and confusing. But it was also 
very important in creating the conditions in which the political settlement could be constructed. Equally, 
the peace process itself was often unexciting, painfully slow, and constructed with great care. But the 
political architecture needs to be fully understood before we try to recreate it elsewhere. In summary, 
therefore, this paper stresses two dimensions of the Northern Ireland story, which are often sidelined 
in the prevailing narratives – the unpalatable and the boring.
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THE ULSTER TALE
There is a common theme among evangelists of the Northern Ireland model; or perhaps, to put it another 
way, there is a version of the Ulster tale which has so far proved more compelling than others and which 
goes as follows:
1. In Northern Ireland, the British State faced an organised terrorist threat from the Provisional IRA 
that demanded a British withdrawal from the province. The British state tried to defeat the IRA 
through security policy only, but found that it could not do so; both parties became locked in 
a military ‘stalemate’. 
2. After three decades of stasis, the British Government changed approach and decided to negotiate 
with the terrorists. 
3. This made possible an ‘inclusive peace settlement’ that brought in the  ‘extremes’ and ended 
the violence. 
The key lessons derived  from this basic narrative – and assumed to be applicable to other conflict zones are 
as follows: 
1. The state should be prepared to talk to terrorists. Lines of communication should be maintained 
at all times.
2. Talks should not be predicated on rigid pre-conditions, because they discourage terrorists from taking 
up the process of dialogue. 
3. In a conflict, a settlement can only be achieved by the accommodation of the ‘extremes’, even if 
this risks undermining ‘moderates’.
Rather than discuss the ‘lessons’, what I am primarily interested in is the ‘what happened’ side of things. 
Above all, I want to question the influential and oft-stated idea that the magic solution in Northern Ireland 
– and the key lesson for the rest of the world – was that ‘talking to terrorists’, engaging with the extremes, 
was the key variable in the search for peace: that this is what changed in the 1990s; there was a shift from 
an unwinnable military war; and both sides put aside their moral scruples for the greater good and gathered 
around the table.
This is not to dismiss the importance of bringing in the ‘extremes’; this was part of the story and part of the 
success in Northern Ireland. Evidently, with the ‘extremes’ on board, a peace deal was given another level of 
durability. However, other aspects have been forgotten and – in some respects – willfully neglected, which 
also form part of the story. 
First, the idea that talking to terrorists was an innovation of the 1990s is probably the most misleading of all 
the commonplaces. Talks between the British government and the IRA – both direct and indirect – occurred 
on a number of occasions through the 1970s and 1980s. When it was part of part of a wider and clearly 
defined strategy, as it was in the 1990s, talking to the IRA became an important fabric of the eventual deal. 
Strategically, this made sense in 1993 and, arguably, earlier than that. However, in the first fifteen years of 
the conflict, the act of talking to terrorists was too often a symptom of policy drift, a sign of exhaustion, or 
part of a simple desire on the part of the British government extrication from the Northern Ireland problem. 
On these occasions, such as 1972 and 1975, it risked strengthening the IRA’s perception that it was their 
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violent campaign that had delivered results. In addition 
to providing a boost to the IRA, some of these early 
communications encouraged loyalists to mobilise 
and ratchet up their campaign in the 1970s. More 
importantly, they also risked undermining more reliable 
partners for peace, including mainstream nationalists 
or Unionists, whose support levels fluctuated at 
various times. It is sometimes forgotten that the Irish 
government was very much opposed to direct British 
negotiations with the IRA for most of the 1970s and 
much of the 1980s, particularly when they were 
left out of the loop. Prominent figures such as the 
late Garret FitzGerald believed that they undercut 
legitimate voices and contributed to instability. 
THE ORIGINS OF THE PEACE PROCESS
There are also a number of misleading commonplaces 
about the origins of the peace process. Some view 
it through the prism of the DUP-Sinn Féin, which 
characterised the final stages of the process. Others 
see it as the outcome of a lengthy bi-lateral dialogue 
between the British state and the IRA that went back 
to the late 1980s.Yet bringing in the terrorists was not 
the absolute priority at the outset of the Northern Irish 
peace process. Sinn Féin involvement was preferable 
but it was not the be-all and end-all of any projected 
deal. The settlement train, to adapt a phrase from Tony 
Blair, had a momentum of its own. Crucially, there 
were a number of important ‘preconditions’ placed 
on Sinn Féin involvement in the peace process. Article 
9 of the Downing Street Declaration – a joint initiative 
announced by the British and Irish governments on 
15 December 1993 – established that the conditions 
for peace negotiations were as follows: 
The British and Irish governments reiterate that the 
achievement of peace must involve a permanent end 
to the use of, or support for, paramilitary violence. They 
confirm that, in these circumstances, democratically 
mandated parties which establish a commitment to 
exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown 
that they abide by the democratic process, are free 
to participate fully in democratic politics and to join 
in dialogue in due course between the governments 
and the political parties on the way ahead.
While there was to be some ambiguity as to how this 
commitment to “exclusively peaceful methods” was 
to be demonstrated, it did serve to establish some 
ground rules for conduct before the IRA ceasefire of 
31 August 1994.
BORING REALITIES: PRE-CONDITIONS AND THE 
ARCHITECTURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS 
Conventional wisdom now holds that pre-conditions 
slowed up the peace process, were manipulated by 
obstructionists, and stored up problems to be dealt 
with later on. On the contrary, there is compelling 
evidence that the pre-conditions were crucial to the 
eventual deal because, without them, there may 
not have been a sustainable peace process in the 
first instance. Once again, it is worth reiterating that 
‘constructive ambiguity’ was no bad thing; flexibility 
about the precise meaning of certain pre-conditions 
was a useful device for government to have. But 
without any pre-conditions at all, it is hard to imagine 
how the foundations of the peace process could have 
been constructed. 
This brings me to the boring point I adverted to in 
the introduction – which is that a key component in 
Northern Ireland was that normal politics (by which is 
meant democratic and peaceful politics) was preserved 
and protected by the process. 
One might, in fact, say that there were two peace 
processes running side-by-side in the early 1990s, 
but that we are in danger of forgetting one of them. 
On the one hand, as we are all aware, the British had 
some stuttering and stop-start contacts with the IRA, 
which were to become increasingly more important. 
At the same time, there had also been multi-party 
talks going on with all the main constitutional parties 
from the early 1990s, and these were also to become 
increasingly important. 
Crucially, when the situation came to a head, the 
government prioritised the latter talks – those with 
non-violent parties – time and time again over the 
1990s, even if it did want to abandon the other 
contacts. In other words the process was painstakingly 
constructed, with great care and patience, and a sense 
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of balance. In this respect, advocates of the Northern 
Ireland model might be better placed to revisit the 
importance of the Downing Street Declaration, 
the ‘principle of consent’, the notion of ‘sufficient 
consensus’, the Heads of Agreement in January 1998, 
and the very negotiation of the Belfast Agreement 
itself. The real achievement was not only the fact that 
Sinn Féin got on board the train as it was leaving the 
station, but it was the fact that the government kept 
the train on the rails at all, when bringing in Sinn Féin 
risked derailing it. 
There is, in fact, a tendency to undersell the 
achievement. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 
was a triumph for moderation and a triumph of normal 
politics. What makes it unique in the history of all 
previous attempts to bring peace to Northern Ireland 
was not that the extremes were engaged with for the 
first time but the fact that it was ratified by a majority 
of people north and south of the Irish border. 
 
THE UNPALATABLE: WAS IT A STALEMATE?
Talks between the British Government and the IRA 
became part of the success story in 1998. That 
is undeniable. However, this needs to be seen in 
context. The terms of the dialogue between the 
British government and the IRA were set by the war 
that preceded it. By the early 1990s, it had become 
increasingly clear that the IRA had been heavily 
infiltrated by informers and was subject to a strategy 
of containment by the British security services.
To say that the IRA was beaten or that hard power won 
the day is a vast exaggeration and a misleading one. 
Hard power came with great costs and its ineffective 
and misbegotten application in the early phase of the 
conflict exacerbated the violence considerably. There 
are also many things which the British state did which 
were dubious both in moral and strategic terms. But 
when we are asking ourselves the question, ‘what 
brought peace to Ulster?’, to write hard power out 
of the equation is simply to ignore reality. 
Hard power has been written out of many accounts 
of the peace process presented round the world. 
This is particularly the case in the accounts by key 
government officials involved, such as Jonathan 
Powell, or in the narrative of leading members of 
the Republican movement. But it is also replicated in 
many academic accounts of the peace process and 
in large swathes of the political establishment. The 
truth is that the importance of hard power is blurred 
because of a lack of official documentation about it 
in the public domain. Moreover, those who refer to 
the importance of hard power are often charged with 
preferring hard power to negotiation. But if Northern 
Ireland is to be taken seriously as a model for conflict 
resolution, a dose of reality is needed about the more 
unpalatable events which also formed part of the story. 
In fact, one could go so far as to say that there is a 
collective amnesia about the murkier elements that 
went into the conflict and which were deployed to 
bring it to an end. It suits the British state to forget 
many of the dubious things it did as part of the dirty 
war. And it suits the Republican movement – at the 
other end of the spectrum – to play down the extent 
to which they were in a stranglehold by the efforts of 
the security services (above all, by infiltration of their 
ranks with informers).
Further, it is understandable – and highly politic, 
indeed – that elements of the British government have 
allowed the IRA to maintain the notion that the military 
conflict ended in a stalemate. But the whole idea of a 
stalemate is in itself something of a misnomer. While 
the IRA was far from beaten, there is incontrovertible 
evidence that counterterrorism operations were taking 
a heavy toll on the organisation. In military terms, it 
was a movement that was squeezed and weakened, 
and which had lost momentum. In political terms, it 
was a movement that had the potential for electoral 
expansion but which was being held back by its military 
actions. Thus, Sinn Féin preferred to be part of a 
political process that did have momentum, even at 
the risk of not being able to control that momentum 
themselves. It was not an ameliorative process of 
dialogue and trust-building which brought them to 
the table. It was a calculation based on realpolitik. 
And, to a great extent, their sense of realpolitik was 
shaped by their declining military fortunes and the 
increasing success of the security services. There were 
numerous failures and embarrassments in the British 
state’s counterterrorism efforts against the IRA. Yet 
there were also many successes about which we have 
heard a lot less. 
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CONCLUSION
When discussing the lessons of the Northern Ireland 
peace process, it is simplistic and misleading to 
say that the key to success was the bringing in of 
extremes. Despite the obvious temptation to bring 
them in, during the crucial phase from 1993 to 
1998, the needs of the moderates were prioritised 
at crucial junctures, thus creating the conditions for 
a sustainable deal. Though it is now unfashionable 
to say so, preconditions were very important to that 
process – albeit preconditions with a useful element 
of constructive ambiguity. Meanwhile, the British 
state’s counterterrorism strategy evolved significantly 
over the course of the Troubles, with covert (and 
controversial) methods used to increasing effect. 
This took a significant toll on the IRA, through fair 
means and foul. 
It is very hard to argue against the sentiment that 
it is good to talk or that it represents the best way 
forward to end violent conflict. This is certainly part 
of the story in Northern Ireland. However, the act of 
‘talking to terrorists’ has been given a disproportionate 
weight in explaining how violence was brought to 
an end. The main problem with the Northern Ireland 
model – as exported around the world – is that it 
presents the talking process as a self-contained and 
ameliorative activity on its own terms – removed from 
the less palatable ingredients of the conflict and the 
precarious political balancing act which helped bring 
it to an end.   
